Some gloaming where projection dances into induction, some place minds like defoliants call home; a library of eulogies to inchoate hearts and tender solipsists

not looking

is the same as looking

like

branches

are the same as roots

(remembering, though, ‘same’nesses in nature as the birth-image of Thesaurus; the nonexistence of all synonymy)

"Every day the urge grows stronger to get hold of an object at very close range by way of its likeness, its reproduction. Unmistakably, reproduction as offered by picture magazines and newsreels differs from the image seen by the unarmed eye. Uniqueness and permanence are as closely linked in the latter as are transitoriness and reproducibility in the former.”

"the unarmed eye" Benjamin.

the armed eye? experience of life through tumblr or something.

I begin to think cleaning - all cleaning (weeding/landscaping included etc) - is pathological: a pageant of denial, a refusal to confront the abyss of being, of what time always insists on; what is, in its depths, the only thing time can Mean

Cleaning as totem not only of domesticity, of stasis of space- but of kinesis of time. The plastic bag's speech on 30 rock is one of the most intelligent things I've ever heard on television.

Appeals to nature are almost always an invocation of essence or timelessness, but this is completely wrong. The essence of this supposedly essence-bestowing signifier is in fact pure mutability itself, "nature" is the site from which all difference emanates

Will to power is exactly like the theory of natural selection in its apprehension of productive force as the instantiator-instance of the world, that is therefore specifically not bound by a binary transcendental morality or located within an "individual" and "its" being (because to think these things as coming-to-world or as relation-to-world is always an impoverishment). There is no relation-to-world because the world is relation, and therefore a-transcendental difference, itself. This is exactly the state of affairs in the way Bergson describes relation. A Nietzschian or Spinazoian cast of being is just where to locate and depart from a truly anti-anthropocentric ground for critique of the standard model of 'power' and relation to world ([ecology?] a model much more like the straw arguments bad readings of Nietzsche end up producing), where one can see the schemata in which umwelt/umgebung actually function, and where their telos of salvation falls away like antlers in winter.



[philosophy = will to sadness?, where sadness = immanent coming-to-being as opposed to the nihilism of happiness (understood not as joy or ecstasy but as the harvest and end of stasis or equilibrium or stupidity, and therefore a kind of death worship, or worship unassimilating of and threatened by death; death that is also the center around which it organizes itself but constantly ignores. It is the un-affirmation of its own object of worship, and maybe the genesis of neuroses?)]. So, philosophy as a kind of jouissance?


A god is a sort of gag, a substantiation of the incomprehensible or ineffable. God is precisely the externalized embodiment of an inability, and is therefore a sort of beacon or endless presence of unaccepted (or unacceptable?) failure. Religion, then, is a sort of twice baked systematized failure-worship, it is the worst kind of mysticism because it fails to even understand itself on those grounds... in this instance, actual mystics are much more honest, they don't require this second order that characterizes non-mystic religious traditions.

Thanks, Wikipedia. Thedia.

The only truly private things are those we truly can not talk about (much like the most genuine letter is the one never sent). If we can talk about them, we will talk about them; if we will talk about them, they are not private.

Privacy in the contemporary sense appears to be not void, but presence. Privacy is the invocation of a space of delimited exposure, rather than the un-uttered non-presence of the truly private. Privacy is today the sub rosa; it seems never to be, politically speaking, the passage in silence that Wittgenstein implores.

Therefore, what does it mean to appeal to a "right to privacy?" What does it mean to protest Facebook privacy policies? It seems that in its commonest articulation, what is apparently most invoked by a right to privacy is not, in the end, a right FROM intrusion, but is rather a right to freedom from self-incrimination. A right to privacy in the contemporary sense is actually a way of saying "do not use these things that I name private, for despite their non-being-in-a-sate-of-true-privacy (unuttered, unutterable), in so naming them I claim them away from you and from your ability to use them." A right to privacy today seems more an impoundment than a prohibition. "Allow me to disseminate these things without repercussion." This is especially relevant, despite its lack of rigor, in view of a time when biometric technology increasingly forces our bodies to speak for us, to divulge what we would not divulge purposefully, in the form of an actual techno-scientific intrusion. Therefore, in THIS respect a right to privacy does remain an impoundment, but with the caveat that in this instance it is the prohibition of the collection of information about our bodies obtained without uttering them AND without consent (unlike, say, writing something on a social networking site and then wanting it to be unavailable). It is a third category produced by the apprehension of human-being as bare life by the biopolitical machinations of regulatory power.

Privacy vs. secrecy?